rights have come to be integrated in particular PTAs. Within each stage, the account is rich, sophisticated, and highly readable. The book strikes a good balance: It is strongly analytical while simultaneously readable and empirically rich. Along the way, we are introduced to a wide variety of actors and structures—domestic interest groups, elected politicians, national constitutions, legislative processes, trade negotiators, and repressive governments. Hafner-Burton succeeds both in making complexity parsimonious and in telling a compelling story.

One of the great strengths of the book is breadth of the argument and, hence, of its empirical coverage. International relations has a vogue for monocausality and for framing puzzles in dependent variable–independent variable terms, which often obscure causal richness. This book instead embraces politics and unpacks causal process in all their complexity. It offers an object lesson for the ways in which scholars and graduate students can think about complex puzzles that transcend domestic and international politics. However, in attempting to cover such a range—of questions, stages of causal process, time periods and states—the inevitable trade-off is that at times the evidence base can seem a little thin, and that occasionally important and contestable empirical claims are reduced to assertions. For example, in unpacking "preferences," a range of "crises"—such as Yugoslavia and Haiti in the immediate post–Cold War aftermath—are cited as having causal importance (p. 76), but only a narrative claim that they existed in the background is used to substantiate causal impact. While the macro-causal logic of the book is strong, its analysis of micro-level processes is therefore more cursory, often resting on unsubstantiated claims about motives, interests, and background conditions, in which we are required to take Hafner-Burton's word for it.

This, in turn, leaves the reader potentially skeptical about some of the broader claims. How much are the empirics being shoe-horned into the analytical framework? In particular, Hafner-Burton is implicitly dismissive of the role of ideas and norms in her causal story. She acknowledges that the force of human rights norms and hence ideas represent an important alternative explanation. Yet, rather than engage in an open debate with those alternative frameworks, her approach is to co-opt them to her inherently rationalist explanation: "[T]o be sure, the moral discourse on human rights has evolved tremendously . . . yet it is clear that moral norms did not find a clear path to regulation" (p. 83). While rationalist scholars will be intuitively sympathetic to the focus on interests and institutions, those with more constructivist proclivities will be left wondering whether the role of ideas and norms are underplayed.

This is a book that matters for both policy and theory; it has potentially huge implications for the practice of human rights and for the study of politics and international relations. Policymakers and practitioners will find really valuable insights that enable them to better understand the processes by which human rights become part of trade agreements. In unpacking causal process, Hafner-Burton offers insights into the levers and mechanisms for real-world change. At the level of theory, it gives us new ways to methodologically and analytically bridge the domestic–international divide. It also tells us something of potentially much wider significance about how it is that issue linkages emerge and issue areas become intertwined or nested within the institutional structures of other seemingly unrelated issue areas.

Yet in both cases, the book is strangely understated in the claims it makes about its wider implications. Its policy conclusions are ambivalent, telling us that "policymakers . . . are primarily motivated by their own self-preservation to put human rights standards into trade agreements, but these regulations can indeed make a difference in countries guilty of abusing human rights" (p. 164); yet that the human rights clauses work when there are "enough meaningful incentives and commitment instruments" but that they are "not the ideal form of human rights governance." While these conclusions are entirely consistent logically, they present an incomplete picture of the way forward in policy terms. What are the insights for human rights promotion through trade agreements? Should they be pursued or not, and, if so, how? Similarly, at the level of theoretical implications, the book is understated, and the conclusion shies away from engaging in bigger debates with international relations theory or from deriving wider conceptual implications. We are left on the final page with the idea that politics has "changed the face of economic statecraft" (p. 174) in unanticipated ways that have implications for human rights and the international political economy, but we are left wondering about implications that the book has for our conceptual understanding of the world.

Overall, this is a highly accessible and original book that deserves to be widely read and cited, both for the compelling and important story it tells as for its potentially wider contribution to political science and international relations. Hafner-Burton has an immense talent for framing and analytically unpacking complex empirical puzzles. In *Forced to Be Good,* she uses it to great effect to highlight the changing nature of the politics of both trade and human rights.

Europe as the Would-Be World Power: The EU at Fifty. By Giandomenico Majone. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 266p. $109.00 cloth, $38.99 paper.
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— Frank Schimmelfennig, *ETH Zurich*

In its subtitle, Giandomenico Majone's book refers to the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaties of Rome in 2007. But the book is not a birthday present—at least not a pleasant one. The title is reminiscent of *Europe's Would-Be Polity* by

Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold (1970). If their book can be seen as the refinement and adaptation of neofunctionalist integration theory to the adolescent problems of the European Community, Majone's is the pitiless diagnosis of a midlife crisis. He dismisses both the European Union's "crypto-federalist" method of integration and much of the scholarship that has grown around it. Contrary to what the title suggests, the book deals only to a very minor extent with the EU as a foreign policy actor. It is a polemic essay. Do not expect well-balanced and richly referenced arguments or data-based theory testing. But Majone draws on much of his earlier work (above all, *Dilemmas of European Integration,* 2005) and sharpens the conclusions drawn there.

The author deciphers the "operational code" of European integration, depicts its unintended (and undesirable) consequences, describes the impasse in which the EU finds itself, and discusses solutions. According to Majone, European integration has followed a few major operational principles. As a response to the failure of mass-based European federalism in the early post–World War II era, European elites have pursued what he calls a crypto-federalist strategy. They have prioritized institutional integration over all competing values, including democracy and economic efficiency. Following the "bicycle theory of integration," which assumes that integration cannot pause without collapsing, they have pursued continuous movement regardless of ultimate ends. Finally, they have used the "strategy of the fait accompli" or "integration by stealth"; that is, they have prepared and established further steps of integration in a way that prevented open debate, accountability, and modifications. Majone attributes a pivotal role in this strategy to the "Community method," which accords the unelected European Commission a formal monopoly of agenda setting.

This elitist, technocratic, and unaccountable style of decision making focused on integration for its own sake produces inefficient policies that are neither abandoned nor adequately reformed (such as the common agricultural and fisheries policies), as well as far-reaching integration projects (such as monetary union and Eastern enlargement) that not only lack democratic support but also proper attention to risks and resources. Even postwar peace and economic prosperity in Europe only coincided with European integration but were not caused by it.

Yet the biggest successes of the crypto-federalist strategy—the introduction of the euro and big bang enlargement—exposed its limits at the same time. For one, they affected the people more directly than earlier integration projects, politicized European integration, mobilized Euro-skepticism, and triggered negative referendums against treaty revisions in a variety of countries. In addition, enlargement increased the economic and social heterogeneity of the EU, thereby undermining the one big project that Majone supports: the single market.

What is to be done about the conundrum in which the EU finds itself? Majone rejects all solutions that would amount to replicating the nation-state model at the regional level. Not only does the EU lack the normative and financial resources to sustain a Europe-wide democratic welfare state; such a solution would also not tackle the core problem, which does not consist in a neoliberal EU (Majone disputes this) or in its democratic deficit but in the pursuit of ever deeper and wider integration in the face of economic and social heterogeneity. The Community method may have been suitable for a small group of homogeneous and integration-friendly countries but not in the current environment.

In its stead, Majone advocates differentiated integration. Rather than aiming at the Europe-wide and unified centralization of all policy sectors, the EU would be a club of clubs with different levels of centralization and membership. This would allow for a bottom-up process in which each country could choose the levels and field of integration that its citizens desire. Each club would bring together countries with homogeneous preferences, and competition between clubs would improve the overall results of integration.

This is a timely book. Even though it came out a bit too late for the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, it was published before the euro zone debt crisis that moved many of the issues discussed by Majone into the spotlight. It is also a book that shows a rare combination of historical depth, broad knowledge of EU policies and institutions, familiarity with specific issues and cases, and clear analytical focus. Given the polemical nature of the book, the author can be forgiven for painting European integration with too-stark contrasts and colors. The Commission's role as the villain of crypto-federalism is exaggerated. It has been the greatest institutional loser of the series of treaty reforms in the past 20 years, and Majone's prime examples of the EU's hubris—monetary union and enlargement—have mainly been the product of intergovernmental negotiations. The "strategy of the fait accompli" does injustice to the intense debate and conflicts about enlargement and monetary union, not only among the member states but also in the mass media.

There is a tendency in the book to attribute everything that went wrong in Europe to the EU while denying it any credit for what went well. Many claims involve difficult counterfactuals and would have benefited from comparing the EU to other international organizations or nation-states. Inefficient policies, learning failures, the underestimation of risks, and the overstretching of resources are certainly not a monopoly of the EU. Finally, it is misleading to include the bulk of EU research in the great crypto-federalist conspiracy. The main features of the EU's "operational code" and policymaking, the democratic deficits, and the backlash against elitist integration projects have long been uncovered and debated.

These critical points concern style more than substance. Majone argues convincingly, first, that the traditional method of integration is confronted with severe problems of mass support, resources, and capacity, that is, the major ingredients of a crisis of system integration; and, second, that the great leap forward to the pan-European democratic welfare state is neither viable nor realistic. His plea for differentiated integration is not only theoretically attractive but also supported by reality. European integration has become ever more differentiated, precisely as a result of the flagship projects of the 1990s: monetary union and enlargement. Whether member states, old or new, join the euro zone has become de facto a matter of (electoral) choice. It seems that the very excesses of crypto-federalism Majone criticizes help bring about the kind of European integration he favors.

More discussion is needed on the trade-offs involved in differentiated integration. Majone describes the "old Europe" and "new Europe" coalitions that formed on the occasion of the war against Iraq in 2003. These were exactly the competing clubs based on homogeneous sets of preferences that match his general vision of differentiated integration—and a guarantee for keeping the EU in the position of a would-be world power for the next 50 years.

A Stability-Seeking Power: U.S. Foreign Policy and Secessionist Conflicts. By Jonathan Paquin. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010. 230p. $85.00 cloth, $27.95 paper.
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— Jason Sorens, *University at Buffalo, The State University of New York*

In his book, Jonathan Paquin aims to explain US government decisions to recognize and not to recognize secessionist states. He justifies a focus on recognition specifically rather than "support" more generally on the grounds that, for the globe's sole remaining superpower, recognizing a state entails ongoing diplomatic ties and requires some degree of commitment to helping the new state maintain its independence against potential enemies. Using the framework of "defensive positionalist realism," Paquin argues that the US government takes a pessimistic view of changes in the international environment and seeks to minimize rather than to exploit "stability gaps" in the state system (pp. 28–29). Consequently, the US government has maintained a generally antisecessionist stance on recognition. Nevertheless, when circumstances are such that recognizing the seceding state is more likely to create regional stability than withholding recognition, the US decides to recognize the new state.

The sketch of the argument is as follows: If a central government successfully maintains stability, whether through repression or liberality, *or* makes a good-faith effort to restore stability by negotiating with secessionists, the US government opposes secession. If the preceding conditions do not hold, *and* the seceding state demonstrates its ability to maintain external and internal stability, then the US government recognizes the seceding state; otherwise, it does not (p. 45). Alternative hypotheses considered at length are that ethnic lobby strength determines US recognition policy and that US business interests guide State Department decision making. (Paquin more summarily rejects several other hypotheses for which there is readily available contrary evidence: weakening threatening powers, supporting secessionists in weaker states, maintaining a consistent antisecession norm, and supporting the side with whom there is a greater "civilizational tie" [p. 27].)

The author tests the argument by means of controlled case comparisons on separatist movements in the former Yugoslavia and in the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Somaliland). Fluctuations in the relative abilities of central states and secessionist rebels to guarantee stability provide within-case variance that he is able to exploit. Additionally, he provides some "process tracing" evidence from declassified diplomatic cables and analyses and from interviews with policymakers to support the argument.

The evidence largely supports the argument. Paquin persuasively shows that the United States withheld recognition from Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia until April 1992 for fear that premature recognition would encourage interethnic violence and concomitant, destabilizing refugee flows in the latter two countries. At the same time, the United States chose to recognize Bosnia earlier than did the European Union precisely to discourage a Serbian invasion. On the other hand, the US government waited to accord Macedonia full recognition for fear that it would provoke tension or even conflict with Greece. Once the United States did recognize Macedonia (as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, or FYROM) in 1994, the powerful Greek-American lobby was unable to persuade the US government to reverse its decision. In 2004, the Bush administration recognized the state under the name Republic of Macedonia against strenuous objections from the government of Greece, in order to reward the new government for following through on a controversial decentralization plan intended to settle an Albanian insurgency.

The case that does not fit the argument well is Somaliland. By 2001, Somaliland had established a stable, democratic, federal government at peace with its neighbors, a comparative bright spot in a war-ravaged, anarchic country. Still, the United States withheld recognition, and the evidence shows little internal debate at the State Department on the matter. Paquin appeals to a "Somalia aversion" dating to 1993's Battle of Mogadishu as the main reason for the US government's lack of interest (pp. 164–65). However, this explanation strikes me as ad hoc, and an alternative explanation—appeasing the antisecessionist African Union (formerly OAU, Organization of African